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 A B S T R A C T  
This study aimed not only to examine the effect of the objective measure and control-
lability on subjective performance evaluation but also to prove empirically the halo 
effect phenomenon, which is present in the evaluation process when evaluators are 
faced with two or more different measurement dimensions. This study used a 2 × 2 
factorial web-based experiment involving 62 undergraduate students and 77 sales 
managers in the Telecommunications industry. The results reveal the subjective 
performance evaluation manager is directly influenced by objective measurement 
based on sales performance. Subjective evaluation of performance evaluator will be 
high when the objective performance information managers showed a high score and 
vice versa. The level of controllability affects undergraduate students in conducting 
subjective performance rating. This evidence suggests that the two subjects of this 
research using their discretion in conducting the performance appraisal rating. Halo 
effect is proven to have high correlation with two different dimensions of perfor-
mance measurement.  
 
 A B S T R A K  
Penelitian ini bertujuan tidak hanya menguji pengaruh ukuran obyektif dan pen-
gendalian evaluasi kinerja subjektif tetapi juga untuk membuktikan secara empiris 
fenomena halo effect yang ada dalam proses evaluasi ketika evaluator menghadapi 
dua atau lebih dimensi pengukuran. Penelitian ini menggunakan eksperimen berba-
sis web faktorial 2 × 2 melibatkan 62 mahasiswa sarjana dan 77 manajer penjualan 
di industri Telekomunikasi. Hasil menunjukkan manajer evaluasi kinerja subjektif 
secara langsung dipengaruhi oleh pengukuran yang objektif berdasarkan kinerja 
penjualan. Evaluasi subjektif kinerja evaluator akan tinggi ketika kinerja manajer 
informasi yang objektif menunjukkan skor tinggi dan sebaliknya. Tingkat pengenda-
lian mempengaruhi mahasiswa dalam melakukan subjective performance rating. 
Bukti ini menunjukkan bahwa kedua subjek penelitian ini menggunakan kebijaksa-
naan mereka dalam melakukan rating penilaian kinerja. Hallo effect terbukti memi-
liki korelasi yang tinggi dengan dua dimensi yang berbeda dari pengukuran kinerja.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Performance evaluation system models that or-
ganization used are objective performance evalua-
tion and subjective performance evaluation. Ob-
jective performance evaluation is based on quan-
titative data, using real measurement and the final 
result will reflect on the organizational targets 
such as productivity, profitability, and sales 
growth (Bella Vance et al. 2013). However, objec-
tive performance evaluation is defined as judg-
ment based on personal impressions that is un-
quantified such as innovation, creativity, loyalty, 
the ability to work together, sharing knowledge, 
leadership, or the ability to communicate (Baker et 
al. 1994; Bella Vance et al. 2013, Bol 2008). Both 
models are interplay one another (Bol and Smith 
2011), can be adopted by the company simulta-
neously (Prendergast 1999), and actually not mu-
tually exclusive but rather complementary (Breuer 
et al. 2013; Bommer et al. 1995; Prendergast and 
Topel 1996). 
Previous studies discussed the benefits of 
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subjective performance evaluation. Subjective per-
formance evaluation is more reliable in formulat-
ing and designing incentive systems contracts 
(Ittner et al. 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004; Breuer et al. 
2013), developing training programs (Goldman 
and Bhatia 2012) or to promote employee posi-
tions (Gibbs et al. 2004; Kren and Tyson 2009). 
However, previous studies also revealed the 
weakness of the subjective performance evalua-
tion model. Subjective performance evaluation, 
which is based on the human judgment, is likely 
cause a number of problems. Employers who used 
a subjective evaluation tend to behave favoritism, 
and will cause the manager gives a performance 
evaluation, which does not reflect the actual per-
formance evaluation and even different evaluation 
from one subordinate to another subordinate 
(Prendergast and Topel 1996). Another impact of 
the subjective performance evaluation is the man-
ager will use discretion to make score adjustments 
that induce to inaccuracies in the provision of rat-
ing (Moers 2005; Bol and Smith 2011). 
Bol and Smith (2011) used the subjective and 
objective performance evaluation models to detect 
the possibility of bias of rating. Their results prove 
that the evaluators tend to use their discretion to 
raise the rating of subjective performance evalua-
tion when the objective performance information 
indicates low scores and low controllability. Con-
trollability is the employee's ability to control the 
conditions of the uncertainty toward the outcomes 
obtained (Tan and Lipe 1997). The managers will 
increase their subjective evaluation when control-
lability lead to low outcomes in order to avoid the 
unfairness from the employee that will impact on 
the motivation and job satisfaction (Colquitt et al. 
2001). Otherwise, when controllability leads to 
high outcomes, managers will not use their discre-
tion to correct the judgment. Further findings of 
Bol and Smith (2011) also revealed that the evalua-
tors with a high rating on one dimension of mea-
surement will also give a high value on other di-
mensions. Indirectly this behavior indicates a 
problem of a halo effect in providing appropriate 
performance evaluation. 
The psychology literature confirmed that the 
halo effect is common in performance evaluation. 
Murphy et al. (1993) said that the more dimen-
sions of measurement used in assessing the per-
formance, the greater potential of halo effect will 
happen, thus allowing bias. This argument is also 
confirmed by studies from Bechger et al. (2010) 
which said that the halo effect will arise and affect 
the rating when the evaluator is faced two differ-
ent measurements. Evaluators who have informa-
tion or a general impression that precedes a more 
detailed assessment of performance will lead to an 
attitude of consistency to make the initial informa-
tion as a benchmark to provide an evaluation of 
the subordinate (Utami et al. 2014). Thus, the eva-
luator will provide an interpersonal assessment to 
subordinates based on the general impression that 
they received (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). 
This study examined the research of Bol and 
Smith (2011) about the bias from the evaluators. 
Two things that need to be criticized from re-
search of Bol and Smith (2011) and will be used for 
improvement in this study by considering the role 
of the halo effect in rating evaluation, which are:  
First, it is related to subjects of research. Sub-
jects were given prior objective information with 
score then followed with subjective information. 
Indirectly, the subjects will have cognitive distor-
tions caused by the weighting of information. The 
manager will give a high rating without need to 
see the subjective information by itself. The author 
assumed that the rating bias found by Bol and 
Smith (2011) is because they do not consider the 
possibility of a halo effect. Bol and Smith (2011) 
acknowledged this in the limitations of their re-
search: 
“All participants receive the qualitative in-
formation for their subjective evaluation after 
observing the manager‟s sales score. Yet the 
generalizability of the distortion and adjust-
ment result we observe may not be limited to 
this order information presentation” (Bol and 
Smith 2011: 1227). 
Therefore, the authors reverse the information 
by providing subjective information and then ob-
jective information to prove whether the findings 
of Bol and Smith (2011) remained consistent when 
treatment is modified and to prove whether there 
is a halo effect that interfere evaluators in perfor-
mance evaluation. 
Second, the subjects are the supervisors in 
University. They were asked to assume them-
selves as the managers of business organizations 
to evaluate their subordinates. The use of this sub-
ject may have affected the results. This study used 
sales manager as a subject because they have more 
experience and better knowledge of the actual 
conditions in the field, so that they will under-
stand the case provided better. This is in line with 
that proposed by Nahartyo (2012) that the most 
appropriate subjects for research that focus on the 
business is the business itself (Nahartyo 2012: 
172). This study also employed the undergraduate 
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students as a comparison with the consideration 
that the students have not sufficiently known the 
reflect real-world conditions to evaluate the per-
formance, so it is likely to affect the results of per-
formance assessment (Tan and Lipe 1997). 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-
THESES 
Halo Effect 
Halo effect was first identified by Wells (1907) and 
Webb (1915) as a phenomenon of "errors" that oc-
cur in the process of judgment (Jacobs and Koz-
lowski 1985). Halo effect is a strong tendency of a 
person to give a high rating (good) or a low rating 
(inferior) based on the general impression (Thorn-
dike 1920). Halo effect is also considered as one of 
the response biases of evaluators to generalize 
positive impression and a negative impression of 
subordinates, which are assessed, based on certain 
characteristics. Evaluators who have limitations to 
observe the performance of subordinates will rely 
on their minimal information to provide an as-
sessment (Friedson and Rhea 1965). The impres-
sion that emerged will give a great influence on 
the subsequent assessment (Tetlock 1983). 
Several researchers described the character 
and the impact of this phenomenon of halo effect. 
Jacobs and Kozlowski (1985) said that the halo 
effect is considered common and can be found 
everywhere, especially in performance evaluation. 
Halo effect is also considered as an assessor‟s ina-
bility to discriminate specific attributes possessed 
by individuals assessed (Murphy and Jako 1989). 
The same thing is also expressed by Bernardin and 
Beatty (1984) that the majority cause of the halo 
effect is the overall impression of an evaluator 
(rater) to individuals assessed (ratée) so they ig-
nore the specific attribute assessment. Bowditch 
and Buono (2001) said that the halo effect needs to 
be alert because it can interfere with the perfor-
mance evaluation process caused by certain cha-
racteristics inherent to the individual. 
They said that the employee evaluation can 
not be based only one performance measurement. 
Someone who has shown the best performance to 
the company will not necessarily be given a high 
rate because there are other factors considered by 
evaluators. For example, an employee shows a 
maximum sales performance during his work, yet 
he is often not timely in the works. If the initial 
information (high sales performance) is received 
by the evaluator, then the evaluator is likely to 
give a lower assessment with the presence of the 
following information (not on time) and will affect 
the overall rating of the evaluators. 
The possibility of a halo effect emerged in 
performance evaluation when the company uses 
more than one dimensions of performance mea-
surement has been a long discussion in the Psy-
chology literature (Bechger et al. 2010; Belzer and 
Sulsky 1992; Kozlowski and Kirsch 1987; Murphy 
et al. 1993; Nisbett and Wilson 1977). The evalua-
tor will give an independent evaluation based on 
the different measurements for weighting on one 
measurement (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). Initial 
information by the manager of his subordinates is 
considered to be the most important before eva-
luating the other criteria and make this knowledge 
as a benchmark (anchor) in making decisions 
(Murphy et al. 1993 and Grcic 2008). 
Bol and Smith (2011) said that the cognitive 
limitations of evaluators will preclude him in 
making decisions related to performance evalua-
tion. The implication is that the evaluator will 
make the wrong and biased decision because it is 
not based on a real evaluation. Consequences of 
the characteristics of this halo effect can reduce the 
quality of an evaluator evaluation and lead to in-
accuracies in rating. Several approaches can be 
taken to lower or reduce the halo effect, which are 
through the provision of training, increasing fami-
liarity with the individuals assessed, or using sta-
tistics as a control in assessing (Cooper 1981). 
 
Subjective Performance Evaluation 
Performance evaluation is an important instru-
ment for the company. Basically, performance 
evaluation uses two models, which are objective 
performance evaluation and subjective perfor-
mance evaluation. The Company uses objective 
performance assessment based on measurement or 
data that can be quantified, real, and refers to the 
organizational targets such as productivity, profit-
ability, and sales growth (Bellavance et al. 2013). 
However, based on several studies, the company 
not only uses quantitative data, but also uses mea-
surements based on human judgment such as 
creativity, sharing knowledge, loyalty, leadership, 
communication skills and so on (Baker et al. 1994; 
Bol 2008; Bellavance et al. 2013). Other researchers 
have also proven that both models are feasible to 
be adopted simultaneously because both models 
did not eliminate each other, yet they act as a 
complementary (Bommer et al. 1995; Prendergast 
1999; Bol and Smith 2011). 
Subjective performance evaluation is used as 
a complement to objective measurement because 
not all aspects of performance can be measured by 
Andi Ina Yustina: Halo effect … 
396 
using quantified objective measurements (Breuer 
et al. 2013). Otherwise, the researchers acknowl-
edged that the subjective measurement is more 
reliable for contract design, arranging training of 
employees, and can be used as a reference in the 
recruitment of employees (Goldman and Bhatia 
2012). In addition to provide a number of benefits 
for the company, the subjective research model is 
also susceptible to biases that encourage supervi-
sors to use discretion, thereby reducing the rate 
and accuracy in planning compensation (Moers 
2005; Bol and Smith 2011; Bol 2011). 
 
Controllability 
Controllability is defined as an employee's ability 
to control the conditions of uncertainty that affect 
outcomes (Tan and Lipe 1997). According to Tan 
and Lipe (1997), the measurement of that can be 
controlled will lead to better decisions and drive 
up the successful outcome, whereas measure-
ments can not be controlled will lead to failure 
and drive worse decisions. Furthermore, 
Holmstrom (1979) said that a controlled perfor-
mance evaluation is more favorable because it is 
closely related to the contract design so the em-
ployees that are evaluated on these conditions will 
feel fair and appreciated while the low controlla-
bility reduces in formativeness of the performance 
evaluation. 
In the real conditions, measurements that can 
actually be controlled are almost rare, for example, 
the compensation system in the company. The 
compensation system is an objective measurement 
which is always in controlled by the company, but 
not according to empirical research done by Baker 
et al (1994). They said that the compensation sys-
tem as a controlled measurement used as a refer-
ence in objective measurement, then sometimes 
results in ambiguous information because it is not 
based on a real evaluation. Other studies said that 
unfair compensation has a negative effect on mo-
tivation and job satisfaction (Greenberg 1987; Bak-
er et al. 1994; Colquitt et al. 2011). When this con-
dition occurs (low control) evaluators will always 
strive to make discretion by correcting the evalua-
tion into higher rate (adjusted upward). 
 
Hypothesis Development 
Performance measurements that are generally 
used by the company are formal measurements, 
rather than unique measurements (informal). An 
objective performance measurement is more real 
(verifiable), quantified, and the results will lead to 
organizational targets such as productivity, profit-
ability, and sales growth (Bellavance et al. 2013). 
The resulting data is more easily processed and 
provide the time efficiency for managers to make 
decisions quickly and accurately in evaluating 
their subordinates. 
Several researchers revealed that using a for-
mal measurement is not sufficient to perform a 
more comprehensive performance evaluation. 
Evaluators need other elements that can not be 
captured by a quantifiable measurement (Bol 
2008) but can only be obtained by using informal 
performance evaluation. This informal measure-
ment refers to subjective evaluation that is based 
on human judgment such as innovation, creativi-
ty, and loyalty (Baker et al. 1994), communication 
skills, attitude, leadership, and ability to work in a 
team (Bellavance et al. 2013). 
The use of two-dimensional measurement in 
performance evaluation is likely to occur as men-
tioned previously, so does in real condition. If one 
of the information is already known by the evalua-
tors and dominates their judgment, there is a ten-
dency to give an inaccurate rating. This influence 
is caused by manager‟s cognitive distortion (Bond 
et al. 2007 and Bol and Smith 2011). This cognitive 
distortion occurs when one of the inherent infor-
mation (anchor) followed by other information 
that is likely to influence the judgment from supe-
riors to subordinates. In this condition, it is poten-
tial that the halo effect presents and affects the 
evaluator's decision in assessing the performance 
(Murphy et al. 1993). Managers who have had 
good preliminary information regarding the per-
formance of subordinates will use the additional 
information obtained to provide a good weight 
(high) or vice versa a bad (low) assessment on 
other measurements. Therefore, the halo effect is 
thought to have a correlation with the use of dif-
ferent measurements so the evaluators will be 
high or low in weighting the rating evaluation. 
Thus, the first hypothesis is: 
H1: Supervisor‟s subjective performance evalua-
tion will be higher (lower) when the employee‟s 
objective performance measure is high (low). 
Ideally, objective measures that can be con-
trolled are the best for employees who are being 
assessed. But, the measurements that can be com-
pletely controlled are extremely rare (Bol and 
Smith 2011). For example, evaluators who rely on 
objective measurements were not able to capture 
all aspects that are not quantified (Prendergast 
and Topel 1996), therefore evaluators will consider 
other aspects that tend to be more subjective (Bak-
er et al. 1994; Boomer et al. 1995). 
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Controllability influences the evaluator's 
evaluation since it is closely related to outcome 
(Tan and Lipe 1997). If the employee's ability to 
control the low uncertainty factors leads to low-
performance evaluation, then employee will feel 
unfairness. Employees feel that performance 
measure does not capture the whole effort and 
contribution that have been given to the company. 
Perception of unfairness from an employee would 
induce demotivation or dissatisfaction (Colquitt et 
al. 2001). Evaluators would try to use their subjec-
tive judgment to adjusting upward. If controllabil-
ity leads to higher performance evaluation, the 
negative effect in the work will not appear. The 
evaluator will give score in accordance with the 
actual performance. This is consistent with empir-
ical research done by Cropanzano and Konovsky 
(1995) which said that the evaluators will not con-
sider fairness when the outcome is high but will 
consider the fairness factor when the outcome is 
low. Thus, the second hypothesis is: 
H2: Supervisor‟s subjective performance evalua-
tion will be higher (lower) when the controllability 
level of objective performance measurement is 
lower (higher). 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
Design and Instrument Development 
The researcher employed a 2 × 2 between subjects 
and used experiments design that has been devel-
oped and tested previously by Bol and Smith 
(2011). Participants assumed themselves as the 
regional director for an industrial pipe and fitting 
company. The regional director had supervisory 
authority on ten district managers, which are re-
sponsible for two divisions, sales division, and 
administration division. Regional director eva-
luates the performance to one of district managers 
based on objective information and will use per-
sonal notes and some other information collected 
from the interview of office staff. The subjects 
were grouped into 4 groups and got different 
treatments, which are objective performance in-
formation (high and low) and controllability (high 
and low). 
 
Participant 
Participants in this research are 62 undergraduate 
students majoring in accounting in sixth semester 
and 77 managers of sales division in the telecom-
munications industry in Indonesia. 
 
Experiment Design and Procedure 
The access of experiment links case made by 
www.esurv.org consists of 4 links in accordance 
with the treatment in the experimental design of 
both undergraduate students and manager. Before 
manager completed the case, two screening ques-
tions are given to avoid error in subject selection. 
In order to ensure that participants understand the 
experiment case given, manipulation checks are 
conducted by answering questions and providing 
scores presented on a 1 to 7 scale. 
 
The Dependent and Independent Variable 
The dependent variable is based on the subjective 
performance of the administrative office district 
managers. Participants will be given information 
about the personal notes of district managers and 
the interviews of some of the subordinate staff of 
managers. Then based on the information, the 
participants will provide score with the score 
range of 0-10. 
The independent variables manipulated are 
objective performance level and controllability. 
The level of objective performance is based on 
individual sales during six months period. High 
sales will be given a score of 9 and for low sales 
will be given a score of 2, while the controllabili-
ty is manipulated by the presence of external 
factors that could affect the level of the district 
manager. 
In order to detect the involvement of the halo 
effect in performance evaluation, participants will 
be asked to answer the questions that have been 
tested by Utami et al. (2014) adapted to the study: 
(1) participants asked to give agreement about the 
influence of granting a score of objective perfor-
mance toward performance appraisals of eva-
luated administration office managers, (2) partici-
pants asked to assess the influence of granting 
score to the evaluated district manager on subjec-
tive evaluation.  
 
Pilot Test 
The experimental material used in this study was 
obtained from the research of Bol and Smith 
(2011). However, since the research was made on 
different time, place, and using different subjects, 
then the validity test of the instrument was done 
by conducting translation of experiment materials 
from English to Indonesian and Indonesian to 
English. The first pilot test was conducted on 10 
students of Master of Science UGM and the 
second pilot test was conducted on the 16 em-
ployees who have worked for over 3 years to test 
the 4 links that have been created through 
www.esurv.org. 
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4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This section outlines in detail about data analysis 
and hypothesis testing on two subjects that are 
used in this research. 
 
Study I: Undergraduate Student 
Demographic 
The first subject used 98 undergraduate students 
in Indonesia. There were 13 participants who must 
be removed due to not answering completely (8 
participants) and did not pass the manipulation 
check (5 participants). In total, participants that 
can be processed are 62 people (63%) consist of 19 
people in the cell 1, 14 people in the cell 2, 16 
people in the cell 3, and 13 people in the cell 4. 
Characteristics of undergraduate students are set 
out in Table 1. 
Based on a statistical test, there was no signif-
icant difference in the performance evaluation 
scores given by participants. F results of gender 
testing = 0.070 and significance value 0.792. This is 
consistent with Maas and Torez-Gonzalez (2011) 
research which proved that gender does not affect 
the subjective performance evaluation. Work ex-
perienced tests show F values = 0.106 and sig val-
ue 0.746, which means there is no difference in 
determining the subjective performance evalua-
tion scores, whether it is given by the experienced 
and inexperienced participants. Homogeneity test 
shows that groups of data samples are coming 
from populations with same variance. Levene's 
Test results shows 0.864 with p-value 0.465. 
 
Manipulation Checks 
The researcher included two step manipulation 
check in post experimental questionnaire (on 7 
point scale). First step is that respondents were 
asked whether target manager‟s individual sales 
score was higher than others manager (mean = 
4.403; s.d. = 2.161) and the extent to which level of 
controllability affect to manager‟s individual sales 
(mean = 3.742; s.d. = 1.717). Both of our manipula-
tion measures for this study were successful. 
Second step, we asked to our respondents to rate 
about personal and interview record of target 
manager to make judgment related to office ad-
ministration performance. The results of this 
measure shows an average value was 5.177 (s.d. = 
1.337), which indicates a significantly higher value 
than the midpoint of 3.5. We also ask to our res-
pondent about level of confidence in providing 
subjective performance evaluation. The result re-
veal that the average value was 5.113 (s.d. = 1.189) 
that is higher than the scale midpoint of 3.5. The 
last, we ask about both performances (administra-
tive and sales) were interrelated. The result show 
that value of 3,855 (s.d. = 1.658) was higher than 
midpoint. From all manipulation check question-
naire results suggest that all respondent in study I 
had understanding to give evaluation. 
 
Test of Hypotheses 
Table 2 is a descriptive statistics and the result of 
our hypothesis on 62 undergraduate students that 
will explain the average number in each group 
and their standard deviations. The average value 
of the subjective performance evaluation scores 
(mean = 7.31) for the low controllability condi-
tions, is higher when objective performance in-
formation than the low objective performance in-
formation. In contrast to the high controllability 
condition, the mean value of the subjective per-
formance evaluation scores (mean = 6.37) is higher 
when objective performance information lower 
than the high objective performance information. 
Overall, the average value of the subjective per-
formance evaluation is higher in the low control-
lability condition (mean = 6.97). These results are 
consistent with the predictions of this study that 
the subjective performance evaluation scores will 
be higher in the low controllability condition. 
The first hypothesis predicts that participants 
Table 1 
Participation Information 
Panel A: Demographics (n=62) 
  Number Percent 
Age: 19 – 23 years  62 100.00% 
Gender: Male  27  43.50% 
 Female  35  56.60% 
 
Panel B: Background Information (n=62) 
  Number: Percent 
Experience: < 1 year  3 4.80% 
 > 1 year  1 1.60% 
 Inexperienced  58 93.50% 
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will provide high subjective performance evalua-
tion when the individual sales are high. Instead, 
participants will give a low subjective perfor-
mance assessment when the individual sales are 
low. The hypothesis 1 is a test with the level of 
sales (high and low) that are at a high level of con-
trollability. The result of hypothesis 1 testing on 
the subject of students shows the average value of 
performance evaluation on the condition of high 
sales is smaller than the average value in the con-
dition of low sales. This result is in contrary to the 
first hypothesis, which states that when sales are 
high, the subjective evaluation will also be high 
and vice versa. Subjective evaluation given by the 
undergraduate students are not significant (F = 
0.199, p = 0.659) and did not reveal any main ef-
fect or interaction effect of each independent vari-
able on the dependent variable. Thus, hypothesis 1 
is not supported by the data. 
Halo is observed by comparing the coefficient 
correlation between the overall ratings given by 
participants with specific measurement dimension 
(Thorndike 1920). Pearson correlation on Table 3 
shows (p-value = 0.001). That is, the use of two-
dimensional measurements when evaluating has a 
strong correlation with the detection of a halo. 
The second hypothesis predicts that the sub-
jective performance evaluation by evaluators will 
be higher (lower) when the controllability level of 
objective performance measurement is lower 
(higher). The homogeneity test value of 0.362, 
show the subjective performance evaluation will 
be higher when the level of controllability is low-
er, and vice versa when a higher level of control-
lability, subjective performance evaluation will be 
lower evaluator. F test value of 5,124 (p = 0.030), 
therefore the second hypothesis is supported. 
 
Study II: Practitioner 
Demographic 
The second study used 118 sales managers at tele-
communications companies in Indonesia. All par-
ticipants passed the screening questions that given 
in the beginning of the experiment. Data that can 
be used is 77 practitioners (65%) consisted of 18 
people in the cell 1, 19 people in the cell 2, 19 
people in the cell 3, and 21 people in the cell 4. The 
demographic characteristics of these participants 
are explained more in Table 4. 
The tests of equality of gender, age, and work 
experience were done. F value for statistical test of 
gender is 0.191 with a significance value of 0.664 
which means there is no significant difference in 
the subjective performance evaluation given 
whether the participants' gender is male or female. 
This result is also in compromise with the empiri-
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Result of Testing Hypotheses 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Controllability 
Sales 
High Low Overall Means 
 n=35 n= 27 n= 62 
High (n= 33) 
6.37 
(1.300) 
6.57 
(1.284) 
6.45 
(1.277) 
Low (n=29) 
7.31 
(1.138) 
6.54 
(0.967) 
6.97 
(1.117) 
Overall Means 
6.80 
(1.302) 
6.56 
(1.121) 
 
 
Panel B: Result of Testing Hypotheses 
Source df Means Square F-test p-value 
Corrected Model 3 2.887 2.029 0.120 
Sales  1 1.238 0.870 0.355 
Controllability 1 3.151 2.214 0.142 
Sales * Controllability 1 3.623 2.547 0.116 
 
Table 3 
Pearson Correlation of Halo 
 Pearson Correlation 
Overall rating to objective performance evaluation 
Overall rating to subjective performance evaluation 
0.948** 
0.412** 
P value= 0.000 
P value=0.001 
** Pearson correlation sig. 0.001 
Andi Ina Yustina: Halo effect … 
400 
cal research of Maas and Tores-Gonzalez (2011) 
which states that gender does not influence the 
subjective performance evaluation. Statistical 
analysis for age test shows the value of F = 1.244 
with a significance value of 0.294. Result of statis-
tical test for work experience demonstrates the 
value of F = 0.528 with a sig 0.665. The purpose of 
homogeneity test is to show that two or more cells 
of sample data are derived from the population 
that have the same variance. Levene's Test shows 
the result of the homogeneity test 2.700 with p-
value 0.052. 
 
Manipulation Checks 
Like this study, manipulation check was con-
ducted with two steps in post experimental ques-
tionnaire (7 point scale) on sales manager. First 
step, question about whether target manager‟s 
individual sales score was higher than other man-
ager and whether level of controllability affect to 
manager‟s individual sales. Both of our manipula-
tion questions were higher than midpoint (mean = 
4.130; s.d. = 2.308 and mean = 4.208; s.d. = 1.757) 
which means that all manipulation measurements 
were success. Second step question about rating 
respondent to target manager‟s personal notes and 
interview in make judgment regarding to office 
administration performance. We found that value 
of 5.338 (s.d. = 1.324), significantly higher than 
midpoint of 3.5. We also asked to respondent 
about the level of confidence in rating subjective 
performance. Our result show the average value 
of 5.753 (std.dev = 1.041) which means significant-
ly higher than the scale of midpoint. The last ques-
tion about interrelated between objective perfor-
mance and administration office. Our result value 
of 3.403 (s.d. = 1.703) indicated that both of per-
formance measures cannot separated. Finally, all 
there results suggest that respondents felt suffi-
cient in giving evaluation. 
 
Test of Hypotheses 
Based on Table 5, the average value of the subjec-
tive performance evaluation scores (mean = 7.56) 
for high controllability conditions, is higher 
when the objective performance information is 
higher than the low objective performance in-
formation. In contrast to the low controllability 
condition, the average value of the subjective 
performance evaluation (mean = 6.89) is higher 
when objective performance information of sales 
conditions is higher than low objective perfor-
mance information. Overall, the average value of 
the subjective performance evaluation is higher 
when the objective performance information is 
high (mean = 7.22). This proves that the partici-
pants provide a more logical assessment on ob-
jective performance district manager. Experience 
possessed by the participants in assessing the 
performance of the participants made use of a 
common strategy to provide a more real valua-
tion (Tan and Lipe 1997). 
The first hypothesis stated that participants 
would provide high subjective performance as-
sessment when individual sales are high. Instead, 
participants will give a low subjective perfor-
mance evaluation when the individual sales show 
a low result. To test the hypothesis 1, the condi-
tions of sales levels (high and low) used are at a 
high level of controllability. It is based on the fair-
ness perceptions of employees assessed. In high 
controllability conditions, the evaluation will be 
Table 4 
Participation Information 
Panel A: Demographics (n=77) 
  Number Percent 
Age: 23 – 35 years 38 49.40% 
 36 – 45 years 35 45.50% 
 46 – 55 years 4 5.20% 
Gender: Male 65 84.40% 
 Female 12  15.60% 
Panel B: Background Information (n=77) 
  Number Percent 
Experience: 5 years 2  2.60% 
 6 – 8 years 10  13.00% 
 9 – 12 years 22  28.60% 
 >12 years 43 55.80% 
Level: Supervisor 44 57.10% 
 Manager 33 42.90% 
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fair because the achievements will be rewarded 
and performance appraisal will be high. The result 
of hypothesis 1 testing on the business practitioner 
subjects show the average values in conditions of 
high sales is greater than the average value in 
conditions of low sales (cell 1> 2 cells). The mean 
value is 10.819 and subjective evaluation is signifi-
cant (F = 12,976, p = 0.001). This shows that the 
subjective performance evaluation is strongly in-
fluenced by high or low individual sales achieved 
by the district manager. Thus, hypothesis 1 is 
supported. 
Overall rating of the participants was com-
pared with the dimensions of a particular mea-
surement (Thorndike 1920). The result of Pearson 
correlation test shows p-value = 0.000 which indi-
cates that the use of two performance measure-
ment has a significant correlation to the overall 
performance evaluation. 
The second hypothesis states that the subjec-
tive assessment evaluators will be higher (lower) 
when the controllability level objective perfor-
mance measurement is lower (higher). F value of 
2.705 (p-value = 0.109). Thus, the second hypothe-
sis is not supported. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, SUGGES-
TION, AND LIMITATIONS 
It can be concluded that, when the objective per-
formance measurement of a manager is low, the 
subjective performance evaluation scores given to 
the manager is also low. The mean value of high 
sales should be greater than low sales. However, 
result from the undergraduate students show the 
mean value of high sales lower than low sales. 
This fact indicates that the undergraduate stu-
dents have cognitive distortions that lead to bi-
ased judgments. Subjective performance informa-
tion that is presented at the beginning of the expe-
riment stored in memory and the students become 
the benchmark to anchor for judging. However, 
due to subsequent information is not profitable 
(low sales) the undergraduate students ignore this 
information and use the preliminary information 
to provide subjective performance evaluation. 
This argument is convinced by the answers given 
by the subject when the researchers asked whether 
personal notes and interviews assist participants 
in making decisions related to subjective perfor-
mance. The mean value of high sales and low sales 
are significantly different (high sales = 4.84, low 
sales = 5.21). The mean value for practitioner in 
high sales is higher than low sales. This is consis-
tent with the hypothesis. Personal notes and inter-
views information affect the manager in making a 
rating. There is no significant differences of the 
average values are shown (high sales and low 
sales = 5.44 = 5.26). Practitioners are giving logical 
and rational rating in experience in assessing per-
formance since they are supported by their expe-
riences in working and performance evaluation. 
The empirical evidence confirms the result of Tan 
and Lipe (1997) research. The use of two-
dimensional measurements in assessing the per-
formance also proves the strong correlation of the 
potential presence of a halo with the overall per-
formance assessment. Both subjects empirically 
prove this conjecture. 
The second hypothesis is supported by the 
undergraduate students but is not supported by 
the practitioners. Subjective performance evalua-
tion scores will be high in the low controllability 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics and Result of Testing Hypotheses 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Controllability 
Sales 
High Low Overall Means 
 n=37 n= 40 n= 77 
High (n= 37) 
7.56 
(0.784) 
6.47 
(1.020) 
7.00 
(1.054) 
Low (n=40) 
6.89 
(1.524) 
6.52 
(1.601) 
6.70 
(1.556) 
Overall Means 
7.22 
(1.250) 
6.50 
(1.340) 
 
Panel B: Result of Testing Hypotheses 
Source df Means Square F-Statistic p-value 
Corrected Model 3 4.640 2.772 0.048 
Sales  1 10.126 6.049 0.016 
Controllability 1 1.789 1.069 0.305 
Sales * Controllability 1 2.425 1.448 0.233 
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condition and the subjective performance evalua-
tion scores will be low in the high controllability. 
The second hypothesis testing uses high sales and 
high controllability and high sales and low con-
trollability. According to the theory, the average 
value of high sales and low controllability should 
be higher than the average value of high sales and 
controllability. 
The data obtained from the undergraduate 
students are in line with the theoretical logic, but 
in contrast to the result shown by the practition-
ers. Subject students tend to ignore the uncontrol-
lable conditions (low controllability) because the 
objective performance information has already 
given a positive outcome (high). In addition, from 
Attribution Theory said that someone will give 
attributes to the uncontrolled conditions as exter-
nal factors outside of the individual so that the 
high valuation would be considered fair (Heider 
1958). In contrast to the practitioners, empirical 
evidence shows the average value of the high sales 
is higher than the low controllability. Assessment 
decision is based on the achievement of objective 
performance. High controllability or low control-
lability condition does not affect the rate a busi-
ness practitioners in rating the performance of 
managers. The decisions made by the practitioners 
tend to be fair because they use their experience in 
conducting performance evaluations. 
This research gives strong evidence of the in-
fluence of objective performance information with 
subjective performance evaluation. The evaluators 
will provide high subjective judgments when ob-
jective information also indicates a high score. 
Conversely, when objective information indicates 
a low score, the subjective performance evaluation 
will also be low. The managers prove it; however, 
undergraduate students do not. It is most likely 
caused by the difference in work experience and 
experience in conducting performance evalua-
tions. Managers have had a long working expe-
rience (over 5 years) and have experience in con-
ducting performance evaluations while the stu-
dents have not had a work experience. The results 
of this study confirm the research of Bol and 
Smith (2011). 
Controllability on objective measurements al-
so affects the subjective performance evaluation. 
This is proven in the second hypothesis testing. 
Subject of the undergraduate students prove the 
relationship level with subjective performance 
evaluation rating. While different result is shown 
in the subject of managers. Undergraduate stu-
dents are having cognitive distortions when con-
trollability is low, which influence the subjective 
evaluation. This study also confirms with the re-
search of Tan and Lipe (1997). 
The use of the subject should be considered in 
conducting research as well as possible. This 
study proves that the subject of undergraduate 
students and managers differ in how to make de-
cisions related to performance evaluation. 
This study has some limitations. First, expe-
riments were carried out on the subject of business 
practitioners through web. Therefore, the control 
on the respondents was very low. The respon-
dents did not obtain an adequate explanation from 
the researcher. Thus, the perception of potential 
bias is very high. Second, this study uses only one 
industry, so the result of this study cannot be ge-
neralized. Third, this study detects halo when two 
different performance measurements are used, but 
do not test how to reduce the halo. 
Future studies need to improve the control of 
the respondents that the respondent's perception 
of bias can be minimized. By using a variety of 
industries, it will obtain the best results that can 
be generalized and will increase external validity. 
In order to get a more actual assessment results, it 
is necessary to use certain measurements to detect 
and reduce the halo effect in performance evalua-
tion. 
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